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There is a wealth of literature about discounted cash flow valuation. In this paper, we discuss the most important papers 1 , highlighting those that propose different expressions for the value of the tax shield (VTS ).
The discrepancies between the various theories on the valuation of a company's equity using discounted cash flows originate in the calculation of the value of the tax shield (VTS). This paper illustrates and analyzes 7 different theories on the calculation of the VTS: Fernandez (2004), Myers (1974) , Miller (1977) , Miles & Ezzell (1980) , Harris & Pringle (1985) , Ruback (1995) , Damodaran (1994) , and the practitioners' method. We show that Myers' method (1974) gives inconsistent results for growing companies. This paper also presents a new interpretation of the theories: it is considered that the difference between the company's value given by Fernandez (2004) (zero failure costs) and the company's value given by these theories is the leverage cost. When analyzing the results obtained by the different theories, it is advisable to remember that the VTS is not exactly the present value of the tax shield discounted at a certain rate but the difference between two present values: the present value of the taxes paid by the unlevered company less the present value of the taxes paid by the levered company. The risk of the taxes paid by the unlevered company is smaller than the risk of the taxes paid by the levered company.
A brief review of the most significant papers
Gordon & E. Shapiro (1956) showed that the present value of a flow F growing at the rate g, when discounted
at the rate K, is: PV 0 = F 1 / (K-g) Modigliani and Miller (1958) studied the effect of leverage on the firm's value. Their proposition 1 (1958, formula 3) states that, in the absence of taxes, the firm's value is independent of its debt, i.e., E + D = Vu, if T = 0. E is the equity value, D is the debt value, Vu is the value of the unlevered company and T is the tax rate.
In the presence of taxes, their second proposition (1963, formula 12.c) states that the required return on equity flows (Ke) increases at a rate that is directly proportional to the debt to equity ratio (D/E) at market value:
[1] Ke = Ku + (D/E) (1-T) (Ku -Kd) In the presence of taxes and for the case of perpetuities, their first proposition is transformed into (1963, formula 3):
[2] E 0 + D 0 = Vu + D T DT is the value of the tax shield (VTS) for perpetuities. But it is important to note that they arrive to the value of value of the tax shield (VTS) by discounting the present value of the tax savings due to interest payments of a risk free debt (T D R F ) at the risk free rate (R F ).
They also state in their paper (1963, formula 33 .c) that, in an investment that can be financed totally by debt, the required return on the debt must be equal to the required return on the as set flows: if D / (D+E) = 100%, Kd = Ku.
The purpose of Modigliani and Miller was to illustrate the tax impact of debt on value. They never addressed the issue of the riskiness of the taxes and only treated perpetuities. If we relax the no -growth assumption, then new formulas are needed.
In the case of dividends, they said that they were irrelevant if the taxes on dividends and capital gains were the same. Given equal taxes, the shareholder would have no preference between receiving dividends or selling shares. Modigliani & Miller (1963) give a number of valuation formulas that we shall use in this book:
Their formula (31.c) is: WACC = Ku [1 -T D / (E+D)].
Their formula (11.c) is: WACC BT = Ku -D T (Ku -Kd) / (E+D).
However, in their last equation, Modigliani & Miller (1963) propose calculating the company's target finance structure [D / (D+E)] using book values for D and E, instead of market values. This is obviously incorrect.
Myers (1974) was responsible for introducing the APV (adjusted present value).
According to Myers, the value of the levered company is equal to the value of the debt-free company (Vu) plus the present value of the tax shield due to the payment of interest (VTS ). Myers proposes that the VTS be calculated as follows:
The argument is that the risk of the tax saving arising from the use of debt is the same as the risk of the debt. Benninga and Sarig (1997) claim that if there are personal taxes, the tax benefits of the debt should be discounted with after-personal -tax discount rates. According to them,
The corporate income tax is T, the personal tax rate on shares is T PA and the personal tax rate on debt is Miller (1977) argues that while there is an optimal debt structure for companies as a whole, such a structure does not exist for each company. Miller argues that due to the clientele effect, debt does not add any value to the company. Consequently, according to Miller, E+D = Vu.
He also introduces personal income tax as well as corporate income tax. The tax rate for the company is T, the personal tax rate on shares is TPA and the personal tax rate on debt is TPD. According to Miller, for a perpetuity, the value of the debt -free company after personal income tax is Vu = FCF (1-T PA ) / Ku. If the company has debt with a nominal value N, its value is: D = N Kd (1-T PD )/Kd.
Miller says that the value created by debt, in the case of perpetuites, is:
But he goes on to say (see page 268) that any attempt by a company to increase its value by increasing its debt would be incompatible with market balance. The increased debt would generate changes in the required returns to debt and equity and in the shares' owners, with the result that the company's value will be independent of debt.
Miller also says that if TPA =0, the aggregate debt supply must be such that it offers an interest R0 / (1-T), where R 0 is the rate paid by tax-free institutions.
Miller & Scholes (1978)
show that, even if the income tax rate is greater than the capital gains tax rate, many investors will not pay more than the capital gains tax rate charged on dividends. They conclude that investors will have no preference between receiving dividends or realizing capital gains if the company buys back shares.
According to these authors, the company's value will not depend on its dividend policy, not even in the presence of corporate and personal income tax.
DeAngelo & Masulis (1980) expand on Miller's work. Considering that the marginal tax rate is different for different companies, they predict that companies will use less debt the greater their possibilities for reducing tax by other means: depreciation, deduction of investments...
Miles & Ezzell (1980)
maintain that the APV and the WACC give different values: "unless debt and, consequently, Ke are exogenous (they do not depend on the company's value at any given time), the traditional WACC is not appropriate for valuing companies". According to them, a company that wishes to maintain a constant D/E ratio must not be valued in the same way as a company that has a preset amount of debt.
Specifically, formula [20] in their paper states that for a company with a fixed target debt ratio [D/(D+E)], the free cash flow (FCF) must be discounted at the rate:
They arrive at this formula from their formula [11] which, for a growing perpetuity, is:
Et-1+ Dt-1 = FCFt /(Ku-g) + Kd T Dt-1/(Ku-g) They say that the correct rate at which the tax saving due to debt (Kd T D t-1 ) must be discounted is Kd for the first year's tax saving and Ku for the following years' tax savings. The expression of Ke is their formula
Miles & Ezzell (1985)
show in their formula (27) that the relationship between levered beta and asset beta (assuming that the debt is risk-free and the debt's beta is zero) is Harris and Pringle (1985) propose that the present value of the tax saving due to the payment of interest (VTS ) should be calculated by discounting the tax saving due to the debt (Kd T D) at the rate Ku:
They also propose in their formula (3) that WACC BT = Ku and, therefore, their expression for the WACC is:
[6] WACC = Ku -D Kd T / (D + E) Harris and Pringle (1985) say "the MM position is considered too extreme by some because it implies that interest tax shields are no more risky than the interest payments themselves. The Miller position is too extreme for some because it implies that debt cannot benefit the firm at all. Harris-Pringle (1985) .
Kaplan and Ruback (1995) also calculate the VTS "discounting interest tax shields at the discount rate for an all-equity firm".
Tham and Vélez-Pareja (2001)
, following an arbitrage argument, also claim that the appropriate discount rate for the tax shield is Ku, the return to unlevered equity. We will see later on that this theory provides inconsistent results. (1986) propose three alternative ways to calculate the VTS. They claim that the most logically consistent is the method proposed by Miles and Ezzell. But one method, that they label ModiglianiMiller, assumes the calculation (see their equation 15) of the VTS as: PV[Ku; DTKu]. As will be discussed later in the paper, this is the only method that provides logically consistent values in a world without cost of leverage.
Lewellen and Emery

Taggart (1991)
gives a good summary of valuation formulas with and without personal income tax. He proposes that Miles & Ezzell's (1980) formulas should be used when the company adjusts to its target debt ratio once a year and Harris & Pringle's (1985) formulas when the company continuously adjusts to its target debt ratio.
Damodaran (1994) argues 2 that if the business's full risk is borne by the equity, then the formula that relates levered beta (ßL) with asset beta (ßu) is: ßL = ßu + (D/E) ßu (1 -T). This expression is obtained from the
Fernandez (2004) relationship between levered beta, asset beta, and debt beta 3 , eliminating the debt beta. It is important to realize that it is not the same to eliminate the debt beta as to assume that it is zero, as Damodaran says. If the debt beta were to be zero, the required return to debt should be the risk-free rate. The purpose of eliminating the debt beta is to obtain a higher levered beta (and a higher Ke and a lower equity value) than that given by the Fernandez (2004), which is equivalent to introducing leverage costs in the valuation
Another way of relating the levered beta with the asset beta is the following: ßL = ßu (E+D)/E. We will call this formula the pr actitioners' formula, as it is a formula commonly used by consultants and investment banks 4 .
Obviously, according to this formula, assuming that ßu is the same, a higher beta (higher leverage costs) is obtained than according to the Fernandez (2004) and Damodaran (1994) .
Inselbag and Kaufold (1997) argue that if the firm targets the dollar values of debt outstanding, the VTS is
given by Myers formula. However, if the firm targets a constant debt/value ratio, the VTS is given by Miles and Ezzell formula 5 . Th e authors use the example of a company, Media Inc., with two alternative financing strategies: the first, setting the planned quantity of debt and the second, setting the debt ratio.
According to them, the present value of the tax shield due to the payment of interest (VTS ) is greater if the company sets the planned quantity of debt than if it sets the debt ratio. We do not agree with this for two reasons. The first is that we do not see any companies firing their COO or CFO because they propose a target debt ratio (instead of fixing the quantity of debt). The second is that, as we have already said, the VTS is the difference between two present values: that of taxes in the unlevered company and that of taxes in the levered company. Inselbag and Kaufold argue that having a target debt ratio is riskier than setting the quantity of debt. If this were to be so, the present value of the taxes to be paid in the levered company should be greater in the company that sets the quantity of debt and, consequently, the VTS would be less, which is exactly the opposite of what they propose.
Copeland, Koller y Murrin (2000)
6 treat the Adjusted Present Value in their Appendix A. They only mention perpetuities and propose only two ways of calculating the VTS: Harris y Pringle (1985) and Myers (1974) . They conclude "we leave it to the reader's judgment to decide which approach best fits his or her situation". They also claim that "the finance literature does not provide a clear answer about which discount rate for the tax benefit of interest is theoretically correct."
Fernandez (2001)
shows that the discounted value of tax shields is the difference between the present values of two different cash flows with their own risk: the present value of taxes for the unlevered company and the present value of taxes for the levered company. This implies as a first guideline that, for the particular case of a perpetuity and a world without costs of leverage, the discounted value of tax shields is equal to the tax rate times the value of debt (i.e. the Fernandez (2004), Myers and Modigliani-Miller) . The discounted value of tax shields can be lower, when costs of leverage exist. In that case, it is shown that, since the existence of leverage costs is independent of taxes, a second guideline for the appropriateness of the valuation method should be that the discounted value of tax shields when there are no taxes is negative.
23 valuation theories proposed in the literature to estimate the present discounted value of tax shields are analized according to their performance relative to the proposed guidelines. By analyzing perpetuities, the author is able to eliminate 8 theories that not only do not provide us with a value of the tax shield of DT (as the candidates for a world without cost of leverage should), nor do they provide us with a negative VTS when there are no taxes (as the candidates for a world with leverage cost should). The 8 candidates eliminated due to a lack of consistent results include Harris-Pringle (1985) or Ruback (1995) , Miles-Ezzell (1980), and Miller (1977) .
By analyzing constant growth companies, the author is able to see there is but one theory that provides consistent results in a world without leverage cost. In accordance with this theory, the VTS is the present value of DTKu discounted at the unlevered cost of equity (Ku). It is not the interest tax shield that is discounted.
The author finds three theories that provide consistent results in a world with leverage cost: Fernandez (2001) 7 , Damodaran (1994) and Practitioners Only Fernandez (2001) is fully applicable, while the other two are applicable up to a certain point. The differences among the theories can be attributed to the implied leverage cost in each of them.
Following an empirical approach, Graham (2000) estimates value creation due to debt at 9.7% of the company's value. If personal income tax is included, value creation is reduced to 4.3% of the company's value.
The author concludes saying "I suspect that many debt-conservative firms, if they objectively consider the issue, will reach the conclusion that they should use more debt". 
Main formulas in the most significant papers
Different expressions of the Value of the tax shield and of the required return to equity
4 Harris-Pringle (1985) , Ruback (1995) PV
PV = Present value; T = Corporate tax rate; Ku = Cost of unlevered equity (required return of unlevered equity); Ke = Cost of levered equity (requi red return of levered equity); Kd = Required return of debt = cost of debt; D = Value of debt; E = Value of equity; R F = Risk free rate; WACC = weighted average cost of capital;
According to the Fernandez (2004) theory, the VTS is the present value of DTKu (not the interest tax shield) discounted at the unlevered cost of equity (Ku). This theory implies that the relationship between the leveraged beta and the unlevered beta is
The second theory is that of Damodaran (1994) . Although Damodaran does not mention what should be the discounted value of the tax shield, his formula relating the levered beta with the asset beta
It is important to notice that formula [8] is exactly formula [7] assuming that βd = 0. Although one interpretation of this assumption is that "all of the firm's risk is borne by the stockholders (i.e., the beta of the debt is zero)" 8 , we think that it is difficult to justify that the return on the debt is uncorrelated with the return on assets of the firm. We rather interpret formula [8] as an attempt to introduce leverage cost in the valuation: for a given risk of the assets (β u), by using formula [8] we obtain a higher β L (and consequently a higher Ke and a lower equity value) than with formula [7].
We label the third theory as being that of practitioners. The formula that relates the levered beta with the asset beta
It is important to notice that formula [9] is exactly formula [8] eliminating the (1-T) term. We interpret formula [9] as an attempt to introduce still higher leverage cost in the valuation: for a given risk of the assets (βu), by using formula [9] we obtain a higher β L (and consequently a higher Ke and a lower equity value) than with formula [8]. Harris and Pringle (1985) , and Ruback (1995) propose that the value creation of the tax shield is the present value of the interest tax shield discounted at the unlevered cost of equity (Ku). One straight interpretation of this assumption is that "the interest tax shields have the same systematic risk as the firm's underlying cash flows"
9
. But another interpretation comes from analyzing the formula that relates the levered beta with the asset beta:
It is important to notice that formula According to Myers (1974) , the value creation of the tax shield is the present value of the interest tax shield discounted at the cost of debt (Kd). The argument is that the risk of the tax saving arising from the use of debt is the same as the risk of the debt.
The sixth theory is that of Miles and Ezzell (1980) . The seventh theory is Miller (1977) . The value of the firm is independent of its capital structure, that is,
8 See page 31 of Damodaran (1994) 9 Kaplan and Ruback (1995) The eighth theory is Fernandez (2001) . It quantifies the leverage cost (assuming that Fernandez (2004) provides the VTS wi thout leverage costs) as PV[Ku; D (Kd-RF)]. One way of interpreting this assumption is that the reduction in the value of the firm due to leverage is proportional to the amount of debt and to the difference of the required return on debt minus the risk free rate. The cost of leverage does not depend on tax rate. 
Different expressions of the levered beta
The different expressions of β L (levered beta) according to the various papers are:
Fernandez (2004) 11 : Harris & Pringle (1985) 12 , Ruback (1995) : Myers (1974) 13 :
In the case of a perpetuity growing at a rate g:
Miles & Ezzell (1980) 14 : Miller (1977) :
The basic problem: the value of the tax shield due to the payment of interest (VTS)
Fernandez (2005) shows that in a world without leverage cost, the discounted value of the tax shields for a perpetuity is DT. It is assumed that the debt's market value (D) is equal to its book value 15 (N). With these two conditions, we are able to eliminate 3 theories that not only do not provide us with a value of the tax shield of DT (as the candidates for a world without cost of leverage should), nor do they provide us with a negative VTS when there are no taxes (as the candidates for a world with leverage cost should). The 3 candidates eliminated due to a lack of consistent results are the following: Harris-Pringle (1985) or Ruback (1995) , Miles-Ezzell (1980, and Miller (1977) .
The 8 candidate theories provide a value of VTS = 0 if D = 0. 
Harris (2001) Fernandez (2004) and Myers 3 theories do not accomplish the necessary conditions to be considered: Harris-Pringle (1985) or Ruback (1995) , Miles-Ezzell (1980), and Miller (1977) .
Analysis of competing theories in a world without cost of leverage and with constant growth
It is clear that the required return to levered equity (Ke) should be higher than the required return to assets (Ku). Table 3 shows that only Fernandez (2004) provides us always with Ke > Ku. We would point out again that this expression is not a cash flow's PV, but the difference between two present values of two cash flows with a different risk: the taxes of the company without debt and the taxes of the company with debt.
Differences in the valuation according to the most significant papers
Growing perpetuity with a preset debt ratio of 30%.
Upon applying the above formulas to a company with FCF 1 = 100, Ku = 10%, Kd = 7%, [D/(D+E)] = 30%, T = 35%, R F = 5%, and g = 5%, we obtain the values given in Table 4 . The value of the unlevered company (Vu) is 2,000 in all cases. Note that, according to Myers, Ke < Ku = 10%, which makes no sense. Neither does it make any sense that VTS > D , which is what happens when g> Kd (1-T); in the example, when g > 4.55%. If we make changes to the growth rate, Tables 5 to 7 show the valuation's basic parameters at different values of the growth rate g. Table 5 shows that the company's WACC is independent of growth, according to all the theories except Myers'. According to Myers, the WACC falls when growth increases and is equal to growth when g = Kd
[D(1-T)+E]/(E+D); in the example, when g = 6,265%. Table 6 show that the VTS according to the Fernandez (2004) Table 7 shows that the required return to equity is independent of growth according to all the theories except Myers'. According to Myers, Ke falls when growth increases and is equal to Ku when g = Kd(1-T). In the example, when g = 4.55%. Obviously, this makes no sense. If the debt ratio is changed, Tables 8 and 9 show the valuation's basic parameters at different debt ratios. 
Growing perpetuity with preset debt.
The hypotheses of Table 10 are identical to those of Table 4 , with the sole difference that the initial debt level is set at 759.49 (instead of the debt ratio of 30%). The value of the unlevered company (Vu) is 2,000 in all cases. Note that, according to Myers, Ke < Ku = 10%, which does not make much sense. Fernandez (2005) shows that the VTS in a world with no leverage cost is the tax rate times the debt, plus the tax rate times the present value of the net increases of debt. This expression is the difference between the present values of two different cash flows, each with its own risk: the present value of taxes for the unlevered company and the present value of taxes for the levered company. The critical parameter for calculating the value of tax shields is the present value of the net increases of debt. It may vary for different companies, but in some special circumstances it may be calculated.
For perpetual debt, the value of tax shields is equal to the tax rate times the value of debt. When the company is expected to repay the current debt without issuing new debt, Myers (1974) applies, and the value of tax shields is the present value of the interest times the tax rate, discounted at the required return to debt. If the correct discount rate for the increases of debt is the required return to the unlevered company, then formula (28) of Fernandez (2004) applies.
One could say "in practice I do not see why the approach of working out the present value of tax shields themselves would necessarily be wrong, provided the appropriate discount rate was used (reflecting the riskiness of the tax shields)". The problem here is that it is hard to evaluate the riskiness of tax shields because it is the difference of two present flows (the taxes paid by the unlevered company and those paid by the levered company) with different risk.
To evaluate the riskiness of tax shields is as hard as to evaluate the riskiness of the difference between the Microsoft expected equity cash flow and the GE expected equity cash flow. We may evaluate the riskiness of the expected equity cash flows of each company, but it is difficult (and we think that it does not make any sense) to try to evaluate the riskiness of the difference of the two expected equity cash flows.
I provide a more general expression for the value of tax shields than that in Fernandez (2004) . The title of Fernandez (2004) FCF t = PATu t -∆NFA t -∆WCR t (7a) 
Gu is the present value of the taxes paid by the unlevered company and G L is the present value of the taxes paid by the levered company.
The value of tax shield (VTS) comes from the difference between (11a) and (14a):
As, according to equation (1) (16a) is how to calculate PV 0 [∆D t ], which requires to know the appropriate discount rate to apply to the expected increase of debt.
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We may not know which are the correct values of Gu and G L , but we know the value of the difference, provided we can value PV 0 [∆D t ], the present value of the net debt increases.
VTS in specific situations
To develop a better understanding of the result in (16a), we apply it in specific situations and show how this formula is consistent with previous formulae under restrictive scenarios.
Perpetual debt
If the debt is a constant perpetuity (a consol), PV 0 [∆D t ] = 0, and VTS 0 = T· D 0
Debt of one-year maturity but perpetually rolled-over
As in the previous case, E{D t } = D 0 , but the debt is expected to be rolled-over every year. 
In a constant perpetuity (E{FCFt} = FCF0), it may be reasonable that, if we do not expect credit rationing, K ND = Kd, which means that the risk associated with the repayment of the current debt and interest (Kd) is equivalent to the risk associated with obtaining an equivalent amount of debt at the same time (K ND ).
Debt is proportional to the Equity value
This is the assumption made by Miles and Ezzell (1980) and Arzac and Glosten (2005) , who show that if D t = L·E t , then the value of tax shields for perpetuities growing at a constant rate g is:
Substituting (50) in (16a), we get:
For the no growth case (g = 0), equation (51) is:
Comparing this expression with equation (14), it is clear that Miles and Ezzell imply that K ND = Ku.
However, to assume D t = L·E t is not a good description of the debt policy of any company because:
1. If the company pays a dividend Div t , simultaneously the company should reduce debt in an amount ∆D t = -L·Divt 2. If the equity value increases, then the company should increase its debt, while if the equity value decreases, then the company should reduce its debt. If the equity value is such that L·E t > (Assets of the company -Book Value of equity), then the company should hold excess cash only for the sake of complying with the debt policy.
Debt increases are as risky as the free cash flows
In this situation, the correct discount rate for the expected increases of debt is Ku, the required return to the unlevered company. In the case of a constant growing perpetuity, PV0[∆Dt] = g·D0 / (Ku-g), and the VTS is equation (28) In this situation, the appropriate discount rate for the negative ∆D t (because they are principal payments) is Kd, the required return to the debt. In this situation, Myers (1974) 
